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Abstract 
This article draws attention to the transformation of statehood under globalisation as a crucial 
dynamic shaping the emergence and conduct of ‘rising powers’. That states are becoming 
increasingly fragmented, decentralised and internationalised is noted by some international 
political economy and global governance scholars, but is neglected in International Relations 
treatments of rising powers. This article critiques this neglect, demonstrating the importance 
of state transformation in understanding emerging powers’ foreign and security policies, and 
their attempts to manage their increasingly transnational interests by promoting state 
transformation elsewhere, particularly in their near-abroad. It demonstrates the argument 
using the case of China, typically understood as a classical ‘Westphalian’ state. In reality, the 
Chinese state’s substantial disaggregation profoundly shapes its external conduct in overseas 
development assistance and conflict zones like the South China Sea, and in its promotion of 
extraterritorial governance arrangements in spaces like the Greater Mekong Subregion. 
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 Introduction 
 
Recently, ‘rising powers’ have gripped scholars and political leaders alike. The growing 
economic, military and diplomatic weight of states like China, India, Brazil and Russia is 
seen to herald a shift from a unipolar to a more multipolar world order, and possibly even 
serious great-power conflict. Despite the now voluminous commentary on this phenomenon, 
we argue that International Relations (IR) has overlooked one crucial dimension. 
Contemporary states – even in non-Western regions – are increasingly fragmented, 
decentralised and internationalised, with significant consequences for rising powers’ foreign 
and security policies. First, fragmented and decentralised state apparatuses and quasi-market 
actors are increasingly pursuing their own independent interests and agendas overseas, 
generating conflict-ridden, incoherent policy output, often mistakenly interpreted as ‘grand 
strategy’. Secondly, as these institutions and actors acquire transnational interests, they are 
also vying to establish transboundary governance arrangements to manage them, particularly 
in neighbouring territories. Thus, state transformation within rising powers indirectly 
generates attempts to promote it elsewhere. 
 Existing IR approaches overlook these dynamics because their focus is 
overwhelmingly systemic. They ask whether changing interstate power relations will 
violently disrupt the prevailing order, or whether there are sufficient constraints – military 
deterrence, economic interdependence, institutions or norms, depending on one’s theoretical 
orientation – to avoid serious conflict. Consequently, they do not consider that IR’s ‘units’ 
may have fundamentally changed, reshaping their interrelations. This neglects extensive 
literature on the transformation of statehood. For instance, political scientists have identified 
a general shift towards ‘regulatory statehood’, whereby central executives withdraw from 
‘command and control’ activities to merely set broad targets for diverse national, subnational 
and private bodies (Majone, 1994). As Rosenau (2003) observed, this ‘fragmentation’ is often 
followed by novel forms of integration. Many agencies, regulatory bodies and subnational 
units have developed their own international policies and relationships, breaking the 
monopoly of foreign and defence ministries (Jayasuriya, 2001). Thus, state decentralisation 
has fostered ‘paradiplomacy’ by subnational agencies, turning them into quasi-autonomous 
foreign policy actors (Aldecoa and Keating, 1999). International Political Economy (IPE) and 
Global Governance scholars have explored how such changes have generated 
transgovernmental networks and networked, multilevel governance arrangements, 
particularly at the regional level (Slaughter, 2004; Cerny, 2010). However, IR scholars either 
dismiss these insights as irrelevant in the study of rising powers, which are assumed to be 
‘Westphalian’ states immune from such transformations, or even posit a reverse shift:   
 
it appears that a century of wars and diplomacy has brought the international system right 
back to where it was at its inception... the way [is] being paved back to Westphalia... by rising 
powers such as China, India and Brazil, who are staunch guardians of the principle of national 
sovereignty (Flemes, 2013: 1016-1017). 
 
Even in IPE, scholars detect ‘an unacknowledged transition from the globalisation debate of 
the 1990s... to a more state-centric framework in which the rising powers and the West are 
locked in a zero-sum struggle for influence over global governance institutions’ (Gray and 
Murphy, 2013: 185). This cyclical tendency is reflected in publication titles that ask ‘Will 
Asia’s Past Be Its Future?’ (Acharya, 2006), or whether the international system will go 
‘Back to the Future’ (Mearsheimer, 1990; cf. Chong and Hall, 2014). We suggest that this 
reflects more of a reluctance to update IR theoretical frameworks than any real-world reversal 
of the trends identified in existing scholarship. 
  Our argument proceeds in three sections. The first surveys the leading IR approaches 
to rising powers – realist, liberal, constructivist, English School and neo-Marxist – to 
highlight their general neglect of state transformation. The second section explains how we 
conceptualise state transformation and why it matters for studying rising powers. The third 
provides a case study of China, insights from which are also used in the preceding sections.   
China is selected because it is the most important rising power, and because it is a 
‘hard’ case for our argument, since IR scholars typically depict it as a unified, authoritarian 
regime ruling a ‘Westphalian’ state, clinging to norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Indeed, it is often presented as the ‘new Prussia’ (Goldstein, 2003), threatening precisely the 
aforementioned ‘return to Westphalia’. Conversely, Sinologists have long emphasised the rise 
of a ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal, 1992), within an increasingly ‘deconstructed’ 
state (Goodman and Segal, 1994), whose internal architecture is ‘more like the European 
Community of the 1970s than the USA today’ (Breslin, 2013: 70). IR scholars must take 
these established insights seriously. 
The first part of our case study synthesises this literature, showing how China’s state 
has become fragmented, decentralised and internationalised. The second demonstrates how 
disaggregated state apparatuses and quasi-independent, market-facing actors are increasingly 
acting overseas in ways not effectively coordinated in Beijing. Our examples – overseas 
development assistance in the Pacific and territorial conflicts in the South China Sea (SCS) – 
show that what is often perceived as menacing evidence of ‘grand strategy’ may actually 
involve multilevel, inter-agency struggles and local economic imperatives. The case study’s 
third part shows how, as Chinese entities develop transnational interests, they extend their 
‘governance frontier’ beyond China’s territory, promoting state transformation elsewhere. 
We focus on the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), where Chinese agencies – notably 
Yunnan’s provincial administration – are promoting massive infrastructural development and 
governance changes to manage growing economic interdependence and non-traditional 
security threats. These ‘mini case studies’ concern highly controversial policy domains. They 
are necessarily brief, being unable to rehearse the vast literatures around each one, and 
therefore cannot deliver definitive proof for our argument. Nonetheless, these cases are 
absolutely central to questions about China’s rise. Is China promoting an alternative to the 
‘Washington consensus’ using ‘rogue aid’ (Naím, 2007)? Will conflict in the SCS, East 
Asia’s major ‘flashpoint’, lead to war (Kaplan, 2014)? And is China being integrated into 
global economic flows in a liberal fashion (Ikenberry, 2008)? For each, we provide a 
‘plausbility probe’, demonstrating how looking at these issues through the lens of state 
transformation sheds new light and helps explain apparently contradictory outcomes. 
 
IR and Rising Powers: The Neglect of State Transformation 
 
This section briefly surveys the main IR treatments of rising powers – realist, liberal, 
constructivist and neo-Marxist approaches – to identify their core theses, but primarily to 
underscore their neglect of state transformation and how this constrains their utility.  
 
Realism 
Realists present international politics as a timeless power struggle between functionally 
identical states under anarchy. Power is understood materially, as the agglomeration of 
factors like the size of states’ territories, populations, economies and armed forces. Economic 
growth is seen as fungible into military power and, since states’ ambitions grow with their 
power, rapid economic development changes the balance of power, fostering insecurity and 
potentially armed conflict (Gilpin, 1981). Resource conflicts are particularly likely as 
competition for scarce commodities, particularly hydrocarbons, intensifies (Klare, 2001). 
Realists differ on whether conflict is avoidable. For offensive realists, war is virtually 
inevitable, with China’s rise seen as a major threat to the hitherto US-dominated world order 
(Mearsheimer, 2001,  2006). Defensive realists suggest that China could be ‘contained’ or 
deterred by new alliances (Kirshner, 2010; Ross, 2006). 
 Realists ignore how states have transformed under globalisation, significantly 
weakening their explanatory traction. For example, many liberals and IPE scholars emphasise 
that economic transnationalisation has both heightened interdependence and rendered 
national accounting useless for estimating states’ power potential (Breslin, 2013). Indeed, 
Shambaugh (2013: 315) asserts that ‘China literally could not be contained’ even if the West 
wanted to, ‘precisely because of [its] existing integration in the global system’. More 
importantly for our argument, because realists neglect state transformation, they may 
misinterpret rising powers’ international behaviour. For instance, the notion that China is 
‘grabbing’ natural resources, often in ‘alliance’ with ‘rogue’ states like Sudan, ignores the 
fact that, following deregulation, the formally state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved are 
actually highly autonomous, market-driven entities selling commodities on global markets, 
not delivering them to China (Houser, 2008). Similarly, extensive decentralisation in China 
has fostered provincial ‘duke economies’ that are often more integrated with different 
overseas economies than each other. Such disaggregation of statehood generates internal 
differences over external relations, not a single ‘national’ position or ‘grand strategy’ 
(Goodman and Segal, 1994). For example, while Hainan province benefits from advancing 
territorial claims in the SCS, over which it has formal administrative control, landlocked 
Yunnan province is tied economically and institutionally to mainland Southeast Asia, so does 
not favour antagonising neighbouring states (Zha, 2001; Su, 2012b). Such contradictory 
internal impulses could explain why Chinese policy in the SCS is ‘consistently inconsistent’, 
swinging between conciliation and provocation (Santicola, 2014). Because they neglect state 
transformation, realists overlook this possibility, dubiously reading sinister strategic motives 
into every action. 
 
Liberalism 
Liberals argue that rising powers’ conflict potential can be mitigated through economic 
interdependence and institutional enmeshment, which can encourage rational cooperation 
based on commerce and mutual gains. Accordingly, relative US decline need not portend the 
collapse of the US-created, liberal world order (Keohane, 1984; Ikenberry, 2008). Outcomes 
will instead turn on whether rising powers are fully integrated into existing institutions or 
remain outsiders (Simpson, 2004). While most liberals are optimistic, some argue that intense 
economic interdependence could breed conflict, or question whether rising powers are 
generating middle classes sharing the rationalist, universalist attitudes needed to sustain 
global cooperation (Chin and Helleiner, 2008; Friedberg, 2005). 
 While improving on realism, liberals largely overlook state transformation. Despite 
liberalism’s generic emphasis on identifying the domestic interests driving international 
behaviour, in practice, liberal treatments of rising powers are overwhelmingly systemic, 
focusing on the sustainability of international regimes. This is a serious oversight, since state 
transformation arguably conditions how rising powers are affected by both economic 
interdependence and international institutions. Following decentralisation, the 
internationalisation of China’s economy has been heavily determined by provincial 
governments’ development strategies, which have generated both international cooperation 
and conflict (Chen, 2005). Yunnan province, for example, has expanded Chinese state 
capitalism into the GMS, where it is the leading Chinese agency promoting regional 
integration (Su, 2012b). However, elsewhere exploitative Chinese investment has generated 
severe societal backlash and intergovernmental conflict (Nung Wong et al., 2013). Moreover, 
inland regions, which are less globally integrated, have a more ‘conservative outlook’ than 
coastal provinces (Goodman and Segal, 1994: 18). These divergent interests can generate 
intrastate conflicts that profoundly condition the effects international institutions have on 
Chinese conduct. For example, while some neoliberal technocrats in national ministries have 
promoted compliance with World Trade Organisation rules, this is heavily compromised by 
provincial level protectionism (Breslin, 2013: 91-99). Disaggregating the state is vital to 
assess whether interdependence and institutions can yield the effects that liberals anticipate. 
 
Constructivism 
Constructivists are also more optimistic than realists about rising powers’ impact on 
international order. They understand states as social actors whose interests and identities can 
be transformed through interaction, persuasion and socialisation; accordingly, rising powers 
may internalise prevailing norms, rather than overturning them (Acharya, 2006). 
Constructivists have argued that China has done so, that it is a ‘status quo’ power, pursuing 
only modest reforms within existing institutions (Johnston, 2003). Others emphasise rising 
powers’ historical culture, suggesting that, for example, China’s normative tradition of 
Confucian pacifism or benign Asian suzerainty will ensure a peaceful rise (Wang, 2013; 
Kang, 2003). Contradictorily, however, some highlight a Chinese tradition of realpolitik with 
more disturbing ramifications (Johnston, 1998). 
Constructivists thus treat rising powers like any other states: as coherent, unitary 
actors – even as ‘persons’ (Wendt, 2004) – with singular ‘identities’; they largely neglect 
states’ internal reconfigurations. This is problematic because the question of which norms to 
adopt and what ‘identity’ to project are often hotly contested within rising powers, reflecting 
wider struggles for power and resources (see Shambaugh, 2013: ch.2). Thus, while 
constructivists may demonstrate persuasively that small groups of officials in the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have been ‘socialised’ into a normative international 
order promoted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Johnston, 2003), 
this does not necessarily mean that these norms will prevail in policymaking. In an era of 
state disaggregation and decentralisation, foreign policymaking is open to a far broader array 
of actors, pursuing sometimes contradictory interests and agendas. As a former US Assistant 
Secretary of State recalls, SCS conflicts have often reflected ‘unanticipated accidents and 
incidents’ involving ‘poorly coordinated elements in the military or border protection units’, 
not a national strategy, forcing the embarrassed MFA ‘to work carefully behind the scenes’ 
with the US to ‘untangle the mess’ (Campbell, 2014). Without attention to state 
transformation, we cannot know whether normative socialisation will really restrain a rising 
power. 
 
English School 
The English School or ‘international society’ approach attends to power, ideas and 
institutions simultaneously. For its adherents, emerging powers are rising not in a vacuum, 
but a pre-existing ‘anarchical society’, comprising deeply rooted ‘primary institutions’: 
shared norms and practices that structure international relations and condition states’ 
prospects of achieving great-power status (Buzan, 2004). Power capabilities are necessary, 
but insufficient: great power status is only awarded ‘socially’, when other states confer it in 
exchange for international ‘public goods’ (Goh, 2013). Like constructivists, most English 
Scholars suggest that emerging powers like China are rising within a US-dominated world 
order, rather than fundamentally challenging it (Hurrell, 2006; Goh, 2013). However, others  
note many contradictions between Chinese rhetoric and behaviour, justifying fear of a ‘China 
threat’ (Buzan, 2010). 
 Despite its considerable sophistication, the English School is constrained by its 
entrenched statism. ‘States’, seen as essentially unitary actors, are the supposed subjects of 
‘international society’. Although nongovernmental actors are assigned an increasingly 
important role, they are simply added alongside ‘states’ in ‘hybrid’ global governance 
arrangements (Buzan, 2004: ch.4; Hurrell, 2008: ch.4). States themselves have not changed: 
the English School’s leading theorist explicitly denies that ‘globalisation is... associated with 
and reflects a new kind of state’ (Hurrell, 2008: 203). Thus, this approach neglects to explore 
how different parts of rising powers’ states may be integrated very unevenly into different 
aspects of international society, and how struggles amongst them may ultimately determine 
whether a rising power respects or challenges international order.  
 
Neo-Marxism 
Neo-Marxist accounts of rising powers, the most sensitive of all to transnational dynamics, 
often focus on China. A Leninist strand emphasises the crisis-prone nature of the 
contemporary neoliberal order and the possibility of Sino-US inter-imperialist rivalry 
(Callinicos, 2009). Gramscian approaches analyse rising powers as challenges to US 
hegemony, which is founded upon a specific ‘historic bloc’ of class forces across many 
states, which perceive US leadership as supporting their interests and receive flows of 
material benefits from it (Cox, 1987). Gramscians typically underscore this bloc’s solidity, 
arguing that China is fundamentally rising within it, albeit favouring a more ‘statist’ approach 
to economic governance than Western governments (Saull, 2012; Stephen, 2014). Finally, 
neo-Marxists influenced by World Systems Theory suggest that China is forging a new 
counter-hegemonic alliance of developing states (Arrighi, 2007).  
 Only Gramscian approaches are at all sensitive to state transformation. The Leninist 
strand is an essentially ‘proto-realist’ account (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008: 85), paying 
no attention to changes in statehood. World Systems Theory generally neglects local class 
conflict and state institutions, simplistically presenting the latter ‘as emerging... from the 
(changing) requirements for the generation of [economic] surplus’ (Brenner, 1977: 27). 
Gramscians have previously considered how hegemonic states promote state transformation, 
particularly in turning subordinate states into ‘transmission belts’ for US-dominated 
neoliberal capitalism (Cox, 1987). Nonetheless, contemporary Gramscians often treat rising-
power states as monoliths, with apparently coherent ‘state classes’ dominating their ‘state 
capitalism’, producing ‘national interests and state preferences’ that diverge from Western-
liberal ones (Stephen, 2014). This quasi-realist approach marginalises contestation, 
fragmentation and internationalisation within states and ‘state classes’. 
 
The Importance of State Transformation for Rising Powers 
 
This section explains why state transformation, despite is neglect in mainstream IR, is 
important for understanding emerging powers, with specific reference to China. We argue 
that, under globalisation, states can no longer be understood as Weberian, sovereign 
monoliths, coherently ruling bounded territories. They are increasingly fragmented, 
decentralised, and internationalised. Consequently, today’s emerging powers are quite 
different to Prussia, and are ‘rising’ in a very different environment. 
 Our notion of state transformation is underpinned by Gramscian state theory, as 
developed by Poultanzas (1976) and Jessop (2008). This tradition is not unique in recognising 
state transformation: as already noted, it has been studied by many IPE, Global Governance 
and Comparative Politics scholars. However, this approach usefully avoids the apolitical 
functionalism of many mainstream accounts, which see state transformation merely as 
rational response to problems of modern governance (e.g. Slaughter, 2004). From a 
Gramscian perspective, not only are states not the unitary actors of IR theory, expressing a 
‘national interest’ or ‘identity’; nor are they politically neutral, rationally designed, problem 
solving instruments. Rather, they are institutional ensembles that reflect and embed 
historically evolving social power relations. Because states distribute power and resources, 
the political representatives of social forces – particularly classes, class fractions and 
distributional coalitions, but also ethnic, religious and state-based groups – constantly 
struggle to transform state institutions to suit themselves and their allies. Accordingly, states 
are dynamic and historically contingent, reflecting changes in political economy relations, 
particularly class formation and the political strategies of socio-political forces. Thus, how 
states evolve and are used is explained with reference to social conflict. This is preferable to 
another prevalent tendency: to merely categorise states as, for example, ‘pre-Westphalian’, 
‘Westphalian’ and ‘post-Westphalian’ (Sørensen, 2004). This only evaluates states against 
idealised benchmarks, and is often misleading: China, for example, is typically classified as 
‘Westphalian’. 
 Another merit of this approach is its sensitivity to scale. As political geographers have 
long recognised, different scales – e.g. local, regional, national, global – privilege different 
interests and agendas. Consequently, social groups struggle to define a scale of governance 
that suits themselves and their allies. From this perspective, the dominance of the national 
scale of governance, reflected in the ideal-typical Weberian ‘nation-state’ of much IR theory, 
is not natural, but a socially and politically produced historical artefact (Jessop, 2009). Thus, 
as social conflict evolves, governance may be ‘rescaled’ to new levels, as forces embedded at 
different scales struggle for dominance.  
From this perspective, the consolidation of the European ‘nation-state’ – the 
hierarchically organised, territorially bounded, sovereign entity defined by Weber and 
adopted wholesale by IR theory – occurred only through princes’ centuries-long struggle to 
forcibly unify disparate territories and overcome competing authorities like city-states, rival 
aristocrats and the Catholic church (Tilly, 1990). Contrary to the ‘myth of Westphalia’, this 
state form became dominant only in the nineteenth century; previously, transnational 
aristocratic politics dominated (Teschke, 2003). Even then, Western ‘nation-states’ coexisted 
alongside transnational empires well into the twentieth century; it was only after two World 
Wars, anti-colonial revolutions and the onset of the Cold War that this state form was finally 
universalised (Hobsbawm, 1987, 1994).  
The Weberian-Westphalian state was consolidated by specific post-World War II 
global institutions based around ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1998). This regime was 
designed to support domestic social-democratic compacts between capital and labour, which 
bought industrial peace in exchange for rising living standards. The Keynesian Bretton 
Woods settlement assisted this by regulating global capital flows, empowering national 
leaders to protect and develop domestic industries, and enabling a Fordist mode of production 
in which a rising social wage sustained demand. The postwar global economic order thus 
consolidated ‘the primacy of national economies, national welfare states, and national 
societies managed by national states concerned to unify national territories and reduce uneven 
development’ (Jessop, 2009: 99). This even extended to post-colonial ‘quasi-states’, 
notwithstanding their relative incoherence (Jackson, 1990), which received support for 
developmental state projects. Their borders were also sanctified through norms of sovereign 
equality promoted through the United Nations (Barkin and Cronin, 1994). And great power 
interventions, while frequent, were nonetheless temporary, leaving the target’s formal 
sovereignty intact (Colás, 2008). Crucially, IR’s mainstream theories developed during, and 
were profoundly shaped by, this high tide of the ‘nation-state’. 
Since then, however, while modern statehood has fundamentally changed, IR theory 
has not kept up. In the 1970s, Western capitalism underwent severe crisis, disrupting the 
post-war social compact by generating widespread labour unrest and socio-political conflict. 
The crisis was addressed in favour of capital by the New Right, which defeated trade unions, 
curbed wage growth, privatised state assets and radically deregulated international trade and 
finance (Harvey, 2005). The state’s role was fundamentally reconfigured, from supporting a 
social-democratic compact through developmentalist intervention to securing global 
competitiveness (Cerny, 1997). Corporatist institutions, and apparatuses directing industrial 
development, were dismantled. SOEs were extensively privatised, and regulatory powers 
reassigned to quasi-autonomous or private organisations, including devolved local 
administrations. The central state shifted from a ‘command and control’ model, based on 
direct intervention to secure economic, social and political objectives, to a ‘regulatory’ 
model, whereby central government merely sets broad targets and regulations for diverse 
public and private actors (Majone, 1994). 
This model spread beyond the West through various mechanisms. Following the early 
1980s debt crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed structural adjustment 
programmes on many Southern states. Coupled with decades of subsequent ‘good 
governance’ aid programmes, this has encouraged the dismantling of postcolonial 
developmental states in favour of ‘governance states’ focused on producing a sound 
regulatory environment for neoliberal capitalism (Harrison, 2004). The World Bank has also 
extensively promoted decentralisation in the South, further spurring the disaggregation of 
hitherto unitary states. Asia’s developmental states transformed more slowly, but this 
intensified after the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis. Here, state restructuring was again 
compelled partly by IMF intervention, but also by the pressures of global financial markets 
and the emergence of transnational production networks, into which ruling elites increasingly 
sought to insert parts of their territories. Accordingly, regulatory states have emerged across 
the global South, including Asia (Dubash and Morgan, 2013).  
This state transformation carries significant consequences for global politics: the 
range of actors involved has broadened enormously; and, as deregulated transnational flows 
have intensified, these actors are seeking to manage their transboundary effects. As 
governmental authority has become fragmented and decentralised, national ministries and 
agencies, subnational administrations and quasi-public and private regulators have 
increasingly developed their own overseas relationships and policies (Jayasuriya, 2001; 
Rosenau, 2003). The foreign policy duopoly of foreign and defence ministries has thereby 
evaporated. Reflecting the decreased privileging of the national scale, actors at multiple 
territorial scales are now struggling to exert power and authority (Jessop, 2009). 
Disaggregated, functional bodies and technical experts have increasingly formed 
‘transgovernmental networks’ to coordinate regulatory policies (Slaughter, 2004), while 
subnational administrations pursue independent ‘paradiplomacy’ (Aldecoa and Keating, 
1999). This networking is seen as essential to manage risks and threats generated by 
deregulation and globalisation. Accordingly, new scales of governance have emerged, from 
cross-border regions to regional and global regulatory regimes (Blatter, 2004; Hameiri and 
Jones, 2013; Keating, 2013). Diverse agents at multiple scales are increasingly networked 
into multilevel governance arrangements, where authority no longer emanates from 
‘Weberian’ states but is continually negotiated (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Elsewhere, 
institutions of powerful states have extended their ‘governance frontier’ beyond their borders 
to directly govern, or transform other states, seen as ‘failing’ (Hameiri, 2010).  
This uneven, contested process of state fragmentation, decentralisation and 
internationalisation carries significant consequences for understanding contemporary rising 
powers. Although more research is needed to fully theorise the implications, three can be 
identified now. First, insofar as they are undergoing state transformation, today’s rising 
powers may differ starkly from those of the nineteenth century. They may not be coherent 
‘Weberian’ or ‘Westphalian’ states. Different state apparatuses, allied with different nonstate 
forces, may well pursue different, even contradictory agendas, and be differentially integrated 
into transnational economic and security regimes. Central authorities may have difficulty 
coordinating these various elements, making their state’s ‘rise’ potentially conflict ridden and 
difficult for outsiders to interpret, possibly sparking interstate conflict. Yet, what might 
appear as a threatening ‘grand strategy’ could simply be driven ‘from below’ by increasingly 
autonomous state and/or private actors. 
Secondly, contemporary rising powers are not simply seeking to unify and develop 
national economies, as previously, but pursue growth by inserting parts of their territories and 
economies into transnational production and investment networks. Consequently, they are 
enmeshed in complex interdependence from the outset, profoundly shaping their interests. 
But while some parts of their states and economies may become deeply intertwined with 
global economic processes, others are less so, potentially generating internal policy conflicts. 
Different elements might, for instance, promote involvement in international regimes as part 
of a struggle against their rivals. Moreover, that one part of a rising power’s state seems 
deeply embedded within existing international institutions does not mean that other parts are, 
or will be subordinate to those that are. The transnationalised nature of emerging powers’ 
economies and states also means that other states experience their ‘rise’ not merely as an 
‘external’ power redistribution, but also internally, through the reconfiguration of their 
economies and attendant shifts in social composition, power and conflict. This may again 
produce serious interstate friction. 
Thirdly, growing transnational linkages and associated vulnerabilities generate 
imperatives for rising powers to extend their ‘governance frontiers’ beyond their borders and 
participate in transnational, functional governance networks. For contemporary rising powers, 
the capacity to join and influence these networks is of increasing importance (Flemes, 2013), 
even being described as the ‘new sovereignty’ (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). Again, different 
interests may exploit their variable capacity to transnationalise their activities to influence 
domestic power struggles. Accordingly, liberal, constructivist and neo-Marxist explorations 
of whether existing institutions are constraining or being transformed by rising powers must 
be extended from formal intergovernmental regimes to these functional networks, since they 
are also an important domain of struggle and conflict.1  
 
State Transformation and the Rise of China 
 
This section develops our conceptual claims empirically through a case study of China. IR 
scholars typically depict China as a highly coherent state, whose behaviour accordingly 
reflects a coherent ‘grand strategy’ (Goldstein, 2003), notwithstanding disagreements as to its 
content. As the quintessential ‘Westphalian’ state, China is said to offer ‘no viable alternative 
to the Cold War structure of international relations based on absolute sovereignty, non-
interference and traditional power balancing’ (Odgaard, 2007: 216). Conversely, Sinologists 
have long argued that the Chinese state has undergone extensive disaggregation, 
decentralisation and internationalisation since the late 1970s. As Su (2012a: 4) insists: 
 
we cannot treat the Chinese state as monolithic, or ‘China Inc.,’ in which everything works in 
harmony... the Chinese state’s functionality is riddled with competing state agencies, 
problems of cross-department coordination, and mismatch between central and local policies. 
 
Our first subsection synthesises these insights for the benefit of IR scholars, who have 
ignored them for too long. Our second and third subsections explore their implications for 
                                                 
1 Preliminary examples, albeit constrained by a continued neglect of state transformation, include Drezner 
(2008) and Mattli and Woods (2009). 
China’s rise: rivalries and incoherence in foreign and security policy, and efforts to extend 
China’s governance frontier to manage transnational issues. 
 
State Transformation in China 
Since the reform era began in 1978, the Chinese state has experienced considerable 
disaggregation, the divestment of power and control to semi and fully private actors, and the 
devolution of authority and resources to sub-national agencies. These changes were designed 
to insert China into a global division of labour, and the consequent transnationalisation of 
production and investment has further spurred state transformation. The resultant incoherence 
is partially managed by mechanisms within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
recurrent efforts to recentralise authority at the national scale. 
 The contested shift from Maoist state ‘socialism’ to state-managed capitalism is the 
primary driver of Chinese state transformation. This has massively shifted power and control 
over resources to a nascent bourgeoisie, mostly emerging from the CCP itself (Lu, 2000). 
Beginning with modest concessions to market mechanisms, by the 1990s the state was 
privatising many small and medium sized enterprises and consolidating larger ones. Many of 
the resultant ‘giant conglomerates’ were then ‘corporatised’, remaining formally state-owned, 
but operating as largely autonomous, self-financing capitalist enterprises (Zheng, 2004: 131-
133). China’s national oil companies (NOCs), for example, now answer to foreign 
shareholders and are primarily driven by ‘corporate interests... rather than by the national 
interests of the Chinese state’ (Downs 2004, quoted in Houser, 2008: 151).  
Meanwhile, central state apparatuses have been reduced, reoriented to a coordinating 
function, and are less coherent. From the late 1990s, agencies associated with planning and 
direct economic management were abolished; the number of ministries contracted 28 percent 
and the civil service halved (Zheng, 2004: 91-106). The central government has withdrawn 
from directly controlling production and distribution, retreating to a ‘regulatory state’ model, 
setting broad macroeconomic policies for other public and private actors (Breslin, 2013). 
Piecemeal reforms have vastly reduced its coherence, with many ministries and agencies 
enjoying overlapping jurisdictions. For example, China’s oceans and energy policy are each 
overseen by eleven different ministerial level agencies (ICG, 2012: 8; Meidan et al., 2009: 
596-597).  
 A second key element of China’s state transformation has been decentralisation to 
provincial governments and the incorporation of special administrative regions (SARs). To 
spur capitalist reform, provincial administrations were allowed to undertake governance 
experiments after 1980, and fiscal responsibilities were also devolved. They rapidly 
developed local businesses, privatised SOEs into the hands of local cadres, and established 
internal protectionist measures, shattering the national economy into local ‘economic 
dukedoms’ (Zheng, 2004: 111-112). Notwithstanding repeated central government efforts to 
claw back power, and especially tax revenue, the provinces resisted and, by 1994, ‘de facto 
federalism’ was established (Zheng, 2007). Since provincial governors rank alongside 
national ministers, the latter cannot issue them with direct instructions. Furthermore, some 
provincial governments have restructured their local administrations, entirely severing 
national ministries’ line control. Furthermore, the incorporation of Macao and Hong Kong as 
SARs under the ‘one country, two systems’ formula has allowed them to retain their own 
legal, judicial and political systems, permitting even greater autonomy from Beijing. 
Accordingly, the interests of local and national leaders are now frequently at odds, generating 
endless struggles over the scale at which issues are governed. Central government initiatives 
regularly ‘encounter substantial obstruction and non-compliance’ from devolved 
administrations (Andrews-Speed, 2010: 28), while central agencies periodically seeks to re-
concentrate power in their hands. Overall, Breslin (2013: 72) argues, China is now ‘a 
voluntary regulatory state, with local authorities still able to decide whether to adhere to 
central regulation or not’.  
A final aspect of China’s state transformation is the uneven internationalisation of 
state agencies and SOEs at different scales (Zweig, 2002). Some of these actors promote 
compliance with international governance systems, but others resist, while some formerly 
domestic entities have themselves acquired governance functions beyond China’s borders. 
This it is not simply a functionalist response to growing economic interdependence, but also 
reflects internal power struggles, as some interests promote internationalisation to coerce 
domestic rivals. 
Consider, for example, the central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC). A 
historically ‘weak and marginalised institution’ (Bell and Feng, 2014: 198), despite 
notionally acquiring independent control of monetary policy in 1994, it has pursued 
internationalisation to empower itself and advance its reform agenda against powerful 
domestic opponents. The PBC’s reformist technocrats have struggled to impose neoliberal 
disciplines on domestic banks because powerful politico-economic interests benefit from 
politically directed credit, which has generated massive non-performing loan books. To 
outflank its opponents, the PBC has promoted compliance with the Basel Accords since 
1990, thereby joining the main transgovernmental network governing global banking. The 
PBC also promoted strict compliance with WTO rules to expose domestic banks to foreign 
ownership and competition and compel further reforms (Walter and Howie, 2012). This 
sparked massive conflict with the Ministries of Finance (MOF) and Commerce (MOFCOM), 
which resisted relinquishing control over credit allocation and feared a decline in bank asset 
values. Eventually the PBC was stripped of regulatory control over commercial banking, 
which was, accordingly, only partially liberalised, violating Beijing’s WTO commitments 
(Breslin, 2014: 1000; Walter and Howie, 2012). 
The PBC has also pursued the deregulation of China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB), 
through strategic internationalisation. Here, too, it faced stiff opposition, since the RMB’s 
artificially low peg to the US dollar subsidises exporting companies, and because currency 
controls enhance government control over credit allocation. The PBC therefore promoted the 
RMB’s internationalisation, forging currency swap agreements with foreign central banks 
and fostering RMB trading centres in Hong Kong, Taipei and Shanghai. The price of 
‘offshore’ RMB is thereby allowed to float, despite domestic exchange rate controls. It 
justified these moves by appealing to nationalists with talk of boosting China’s ‘influence’ 
and ‘power standing’ and reducing dependence on US dollar reserves. However, 
internationalisation was actually a deliberate PBC ploy to compel further domestic reform 
(Bell and Feng, 2014: 199; Cohen, 2012). Experts argue that internationalisation and 
currency controls are ultimately unsustainable, making further currency liberalisation – the 
PBC’s preferred outcome – inevitable (McCauley, 2013).  
To summarise, what outsiders may perceive as ‘an apparently powerful central 
government and unified system of governance’ is in fact ‘a fragmented and chaotic structure 
over which the central government has little control’. Outcomes reflect not authoritative 
central decisions but ‘bargaining... horizontally between government ministries, agencies and 
state enterprises, as well as vertically, between different levels of government’ which 
‘continues throughout implementation’ (Andrews-Speed, 2010: 22, 27). The Chinese state is 
actually a dynamic form of multilevel governance. 
The resultant incoherence is, however, partially mitigated through the containment of 
bargaining within the CCP and by sporadic recentralisation efforts. In ‘regulatory states’, the 
central state not defunct; its role is redefined as laying down broad policy contours for others 
to follow (Majone, 1994). Although Chinese officials are highly adept at pushing the 
envelope, their latitude is constrained insofar as their career advancement occurs through the 
CCP, membership of which is de rigueur for officials, politicians and SOE managers. 
Moreover, the need for formal central approval and funding for major subnational initiatives 
constrains officials to forge alliances with national level actors and present their initiatives as 
reflecting national priorities. Accordingly, leaders in Beijing retain significant power, even if 
they must frequently reassert it through savage purges, such as those President Xi Jinping is 
currently undertaking. National leaders also periodically attempt to recentralise control 
institutionally. This often involves forming ‘Leading Small Groups’ of the Politburo, 
designed to coordinate disparate state agencies, or ad hoc initiatives. These are of dubious 
efficacy, but do reassert ‘red lines’ for officials, preventing severe incoherence. 
Recentralisation drives can also have distinct policy outcomes.  
The aforementioned trends in state transformation are novel and epochal. They do not 
merely reflect longstanding problems of central ‘bureaucratic capacity’ or centre-periphery 
difficulties, which have plagued China as much as any modern state (Shue, 1988), nor do 
they herald a return to ‘pre-Westphalian’ nineteenth-century warlordism. They instead reflect 
the unprecedented disaggregation of a state-socialist regime that had earlier substantially 
unified China’s society and territory. While Mao attempted two rounds of decentralisation 
and recentralisation, this only involved shifting administrative responsibilities. Today, 
China’s provinces have acquired unprecedented legislative, political and managerial 
authority, while central control via the nomenklatura system has weakened substantially 
(Gong and Chen, 1994). Moreover, and uniquely, this occurred in tandem with massive 
marketisation, generating unprecedented competition among and between different tiers of 
government and their associated SOEs. Furthermore, these SOEs are now relatively 
autonomous, market facing, profit-driven, internationalised actors, but they can also exploit 
their remaining links to state apparatuses – again, this is unprecedented in Chinese history. 
Combined, these changes have ‘fundamentally altered China’s command economy system 
and the power structure between the centre and localities’ (Jia and Wang, 1994: 35, 38). 
Inter-scalar power struggles now occur constantly, without decisive resolution.  
 
The Impact on Foreign and Security Policy 
Accordingly, China’s rise does not reflect a monolithic state pursuing a coherent grand 
strategy. Instead, multiple state and quasi-private agencies, having become somewhat 
autonomous foreign policy actors, are pursuing uncoordinated and sometimes contradictory 
agendas overseas, notwithstanding efforts to coordinate them. This often provokes an anti-
Chinese backlash and fears about China’s intentions. We demonstrate this by considering 
China’s aid programmes in the Pacific, and Chinese policies in the South China Sea (SCS).  
 China’s state transformation has substantially fragmented and expanded the domain of 
foreign policy formation and implementation. The much weakened MFA, while historically 
always subordinate to the CCP leadership, now faces ‘intense rivalry’ from other ‘foreign 
policy actors’ (Jakobsen and Knox, 2010: 10). These include the armed forces, MOF, 
MOFCOM, state security apparatuses, the central bank, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), and the CCP’s International Department (Jakobsen and Knox, 
2010: 4-16). Major corporatised SOEs are also de facto foreign policy actors. For example, 
Chinese NOCs, whose chairmen retain vice-ministerial rank, frequently operate abroad 
without regard for national priorities, being empowered to ‘adapt, modify and even subvert 
government directives’ (Chen, 2009: 254-258). Accordingly, the NOCs ‘drive... China’s 
international energy agenda, rather than the government’ (Andrews-Speed, 2010: 53). 
Empowered to independently control their international economic relations, the provinces 
and SARs have also become quasi-autonomous foreign policy actors, concluding 
transboundary agreements with local and national governments as far afield as Africa (Chen 
et al., 2010; Li, 2014). Crucially, the MFA lacks formal authority to coordinate equally-
ranked agencies and, informally, the foreign minister reportedly ‘struggles to make the top 50 
in the Central Committee’ (Smith, 2014). 
 Nonetheless, reflecting the ‘regulatory state’ model and inter-scalar contestation, the 
centre remains heavily involved in defining broad policy contours and periodically seeks to 
recentralise foreign policy authority. For example, Xi Jinping has created a State Security 
Committee and held a Diplomacy Work Conference in 2013, elaborating broad strategic 
contours for China’s many agencies to follow. Major policy shifts, like the announcement of 
an Air Defence Identification Zone over the East China Sea in November 2013, also remain 
contingent upon high level approval. However, even such major initiatives can stem from 
bottom-up proposals, as sectional interests frame their agendas in terms of the leadership’s 
broad policy statements, which are sometimes so broad that ‘one can justify almost anything’ 
(Jakobsen, 2014: 1). Moreover, as the main implementing agencies, subnational entities 
retain considerable latitude to shape outcomes, often diverging from Beijing’s intentions. 
Responding to the interstate frictions this frequently creates, the MFA often strains to 
recentralise policy control – though its capacity to do so is limited. 
 
Chinese Aid in the Pacific 
Chinese foreign assistance is widely seen as part of a broader hegemonic strategy, as ‘rogue 
aid’ designed to undermine the ‘Washington consensus’ and Western promotion of ‘good 
governance’ and democracy (Naím, 2007). In the Pacific, some argue that China’s growing 
engagement, including aid disbursements, reflects an aggressive plan to ‘replace the United 
States as the preeminent power’ (Henderson and Reilly, 2003: 95). Others suggest China is 
‘soft balancing’ against America and Australia, or seeking to grab raw materials for Chinese 
industry (Lanteigne, 2012; Yang, 2009).  
 In reality, rather than being part of a strategic ‘master plan’, Chinese aid is primarily 
driven from below, by commercial considerations, and is accordingly fragmented and 
incoherent. Although notionally centred upon MOFCOM, significant aid funds are allegedly 
concealed within numerous other ministries’ budgets, including Health, Education, 
Agriculture and Foreign Affairs, with MOFCOM unable to compel MOF to even disclose 
total amount (Grimm et al., 2011: 7). This is a ‘recipe for chaos’ in Chinese aid policy 
making and implementation (Brautigam, 2009: 116). In practice, Chinese aid is primarily 
driven and implemented ‘from below’ by various state-owned, private and hybrid companies, 
linked predominantly to subnational governments, which seek business opportunities by 
lobbying Chinese and Pacific state agencies to initiate aid-funded infrastructure and 
construction projects for them to undertake. These projects are frequently not linked to 
natural resources; companies instead accept projects requested by recipient governments, 
with low profit margins, hoping to later receive more lucrative contracts (Brautigam, 2009). 
Thus, Chinese aid is mostly driven by ‘Chinese infrastructure companies in the Pacific, not 
aid agencies in Beijing’ (Smith, 2012).  
Two examples demonstrate this. Papua New Guinea (PNG) receives 58 percent of 
total Chinese aid in the Pacific. Chinese investment in a US$2.1bn nickel mine has been 
presented as evidence that this aid seeks to facilitate a massive resource grab. In reality, 
Chinese engagement reflects independent, profit-seeking behaviour by diverse business 
actors. In 2012, 13 of the 20 largest Chinese enterprises registered in PNG were construction 
firms, while nearly half of Chinese investment comprised small and medium sized retail and 
wholesale businesses (Smith, 2013: 329). Accordingly, Chinese aid has mostly been devoted 
to infrastructure projects requested by the PNG government with no link to the mine, like 
student dormitories. Similarly, a sevenfold increase of Chinese aid to Fiji in 2007 was widely 
interpreted as a malign attempt to bolster Fiji’s new military regime against Australian 
sanctions. In reality, the increase had been agreed in 2006 as part of a wider pledge to Pacific 
governments, before the Fijian coup. Moreover, aside from one e-government project, it was 
all devoted to construction and infrastructure (Yang, 2011: 307-308). Far from expressing 
coherent, sinister, strategic intent, Chinese aid in the Pacific seems more driven by politically 
connected construction firms lobbying for tied aid to absorb their surplus capacity. 
 
The South China Sea 
The SCS is even more seriously affected by inter-bureaucratic and multilevel strife within the 
Chinese state. Rich in fisheries and hydrocarbons, the SCS is widely regarded as among East 
Asia’s most serious ‘flashpoints’. China has issued vague but obdurate claims to a vast 
oceanic area – the so-called ‘nine-dashed line’ – which overlaps with those of six Southeast 
Asian states. Conflicts with Vietnam and the Philippines have been particularly acute in the 
mid-1990s and since 2012. This is widely interpreted – particularly by realists – as reflecting 
China’s growing power and strategic ambition, fuelling fears of armed conflict (Kaplan, 
2014). The reality is far less coherent, reflecting a lack of consensus within China, even on 
the ‘nine-dashed line’. 
 The MFA clearly does not control China’s SCS policy. While ‘theoretically 
responsible’, in practice it is ‘largely bypassed by... more powerful players’ (ICG, 2012: 12). 
A further dozen national and subnational agencies have some jurisdiction here, including the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s Bureau of Fisheries Administration, China Marine Surveillance, 
provincial governments, the navy, the NOCs, and six law enforcement agencies under four 
different ministries (ICG, 2012: 8). According to Chung (2004b: 267-272), neither the MFA 
nor the Politburo’s Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group has ‘ultimate power and authority’ 
over the SCS; decisions are instead made by ‘multiple autonomous actors’. Consequently, 
while the MFA promotes a relatively cooperative line – including ratifying and implementing 
the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1992, and negotiating a 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS with ASEAN in 2002, it is persistently 
undermined by other parts of China’s disaggregated state.  
The navy, for example, has repeatedly and successfully exploited SCS disputes to 
defend and expand its budget (Chung, 2004a: ch.6). Apparently, this directly precipitated a 
1988 military clash with Vietnam, resulting in China annexing the Paracel Islands (Garver, 
1992). Similarly, in 1995, the navy seized Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines; this was 
apparently the price extracted for its support of incoming premier Jiang Zemin (Storey, 
1999).2 
China’s largely autonomous NOCs also generate conflict and crises. In the 1990s, due 
to the exhaustion of domestic hydrocarbon supplies and a profit crunch induced by state price 
controls, the NOCs exploited their influence and growing elite concerns about ‘energy 
security’ to successfully lobby for a ‘go out’ policy, thereby internationalising their activities 
(Houser, 2008: 152-153). However, as relative latecomers, the NOCs found open oil and gas 
fields only in areas neglected by Western oil majors: ‘rogue’ states like Sudan and disputed 
territories like the SCS. The MFA is left fending off subsequent international condemnation 
of their activity (Downs, 2008: 129). Accordingly, the China National Offshore Oil Company 
(CNOOC) asserts Chinese sovereignty over the whole nine-dashed line area in the SCS, as 
this vastly expands the concessions it can offer to national and foreign companies. CNOOC 
has repeatedly issued such concessions, despite MFA disapproval, sparking disputes with 
neighbouring states (Beckman et al., 2013: 429-430).  
The NOCs have also rallied other state agencies to their cause. In 2007, the Chinese 
National Petroleum Company (CNPC) commissioned Canadian firm TransOcean to drill in 
the Zhongjiannan basin, an area partly disputed with Vietnam, which it had been exploring 
                                                 
2 China’s territorial disputes often escalate as new leaders consolidate their power bases through purges and 
nationalist posturing. Zhang (2014) attributes recent tensions in the SCS to the handover to Xi. 
since 2004 with backing from the Ministry of Land and Resources (Xinhua.net, 2014). 
Vietnamese coastguards harassed CNPC’s survey vessels, but the latter summoned China’s 
State Oceanic Administration ships to protect them. These rammed the Vietnamese vessels, 
sparking an international incident (Bentley, 2014). The project was abandoned in 2008 under 
MFA pressure (Downs, 2014). However, by 2012, CNOOC had procured its own deep-sea 
rig, which CNPC hired and deployed in Vietnamese waters in March 2014. The rig was 
accompanied by up to 80 Chinese vessels, including seven naval ships, suggesting CNPC had 
also recruited the navy to its cause – or vice-versa. This caused a massive diplomatic crisis. 
The MFA had to contradict its own policy by claiming that the rig was in Chinese territorial 
waters, implying, at minimum, a position violating UNCLOS (for a legal discussion, see 
Thayer, 2014).  
Some observers argued that this crisis reflected Xi’s centralisation drive and a new, 
aggressive ‘grand strategy’ from Beijing (Downs, 2014; Thayer, 2014). If true, this would 
reflect how constant inter-scalar struggles are shaping Chinese policy. However, these claims 
are questionable. CNPC’s activities display significant continuity, while, just before and after 
the crisis, the MFA and Xi were strongly pursuing improved relations with Vietnam. Rather 
than heralding a new coherence, then, the incident was arguably the latest of many 
contradictions produced by fragmented, interagency contestation (see Santicola, 2014). 
Jakobsen (2014: 1) insists ‘there is no evidence’ that the crisis revealed ‘a grand strategy Xi is 
pursuing to coerce China’s neighbours in a tailored way towards a pre-defined goal’. Rather, 
diverse, disaggregated actors are still exploiting ‘Xi’s very general guidelines on 
safeguarding maritime rights’ to ‘push their own agendas’. 
Hainan’s provincial government is another of these opportunistic actors. As Zhang 
(2012: 18) notes, unlike the MFA, ‘which is committed to avoid diplomatic and security 
conflicts with neighbouring countries, local governments are motivated by economic 
concerns’. The coastal provinces gained administrative control over China’s territorial waters 
in 1992. Subsequently, they developed their own local law enforcement agencies and 
rapaciously pursued maritime development opportunities. Hainan theoretically administers 
the entire nine-dashed-line area, which is 60 times larger than its own land surface. It thus has 
a strong interest in asserting maximalist territorial claims to promote its local fisheries 
industry.  
Following the industry’s deregulation in 1992, Hainan provided extensive financial 
support to state-owned and private fishing companies, increasing the fleet’s size tenfold from 
1988-1997. Fisheries yields quadrupled, but the resultant overfishing of coastal waters 
subsequently forced the fleet into the SCS (Zha, 2001: 588-592). This should have been 
prevented by the national government’s adoption of UNCLOS and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization’s sustainability standards in 1999-2002, which ought to have reduced Hainan’s 
fishing fleet. However, as with many central initiatives, local governments resisted 
implementing these regulations, siding with local economic interests (Brans and Ferraro, 
2012). Indeed, Hainan actively supported the fleet’s expansion into the SCS by subsidising 
expeditions, financing trawler upgrades, and rescuing ships confronted by other countries’ 
coastguards (Ruwitch, 2014). From 1989-2010, there were 380 such confrontations, 
involving 750 Chinese vessels. Crucially, it is overwhelmingly these incidents that spark 
diplomatic crises, not military clashes (Zhang, 2012: 1).  
Recurrent SCS crises thus reflect the Chinese state’s transformation and partial 
internationalisation. Agencies ‘originally established to implement domestic policies... now 
play a foreign policy role. They have almost no knowledge of the diplomatic landscape and 
little interest in promoting the national foreign policy agenda’, and since they ‘enjoy 
significant autonomy’, the MFA cannot control them (ICG, 2012: 14). This explains why 
Chinese policy is ‘consistently inconsistent’, displaying ‘an almost incomprehensible level of 
unpredictability’ and ‘lack of any discernible strategy’ (Santicola, 2014) – not a sinister 
‘grand strategy’ of phased expansion, as realists suggest. However, the consequences of state 
fragmentation are clearly very dangerous, contradicting more optimistic liberal and 
constructivist accounts. The Chinese government apparently recognises the risks: it recently 
sought to recentralise policy control under the MFA and amalgamate five maritime law 
enforcement agencies. However, this has apparently failed because the latter ‘do not want to 
relinquish their power’ (ICG, 2012: 32-36, 18; see Jakobsen, 2014: 17-20). 
 
Managing Transboundary Interests 
A second aspect of state transformation and China’s rise concerns growing Chinese efforts to 
manage transboundary interests acquired through economic transnationalisation. As China’s 
economy expands beyond its borders, so does the ‘governance frontier’ of its state 
apparatuses, particularly those of border provinces. Chinese agencies and SOEs seek to 
reshape other territories’ governance to pursue their (often divergent) interests. To illustrate 
this, we consider Chinese engagement in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), a 
transnational integration project involving China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and 
Thailand. 
 Initially conceived by the Asian Development Bank, the GMS has greatly facilitated 
Beijing’s ‘going out’ strategy, designed to develop its poor, non-coastal regions by linking 
them economically to neighbouring states. It has involved the substantial ‘rescaling’ of 
Chinese state apparatuses, constructing a complex, regionalised mode of multilevel 
governance (Su, 2012a). Following the ‘regulatory state’ model, while central government 
agencies like the MFA, MOF and the NDRC conclude broad agreements with other GMS 
member-states, the detailed implementation is left to provincial governments, which are also 
formally GMS members: Yunnan province, which became China’s main representative in 
1992, and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, which joined in 2005. These provinces 
autonomously ‘receive foreign investments, set up economic zones, manage border trade and 
sign contracts for border cooperation with neighbouring countries’ (Colin, 2014: 112). 
Yunnanese SOEs and private firms have invested heavily across the GMS, notably in 
hydropower, manufacturing, mining and agribusiness (Summers, 2013: 161-64).  Exploiting 
national level energy security concerns, Yunnan also joined with CNPC to successfully lobby 
Beijing for a $5.3bn oil and gas pipeline from Myanmar’s western coast to Yunnan, in order 
to become a key base for China’s petrochemicals industry (Steinberg and Fan, 2013: 180-
181; Su, 2014: 100-102). 
 In pursuit of economic opportunities, Yunnan has gradually acquired important 
transboundary governance functions. To facilitate trade and investment, the provincial 
government has promoted extensive transboundary transport infrastructure development, 
opening the Mekong River to large-scale shipping and constructing extensive road and rail 
links. It has also worked intensively with other national and subnational GMS governments to 
promote regulatory changes beneficial to Chinese investors, including the creation of 
transborder special economic zones (Summers, 2013).  
Yunnan has also moved to manage the negative side-effects of its economic 
transnationalisation, which include piracy, transboundary crime and drug- and people-
trafficking. Growing smuggling and piracy on the Mekong led Beijing to conclude an 
agreement for joint river patrols with Myanmar, Laos and Thailand in December 2011. This 
is implemented by the Yunnan Border Police’s Waters Division: they host a combined 
operations centre, coordinating day to day operations, and train and equip their Myanmar and 
Laotian counterparts (Hu, 2013). From April to June 2013 alone, 2,500 arrests were made and 
drugs worth US$400m seized, alongside weapons and ammunition (Storey, 2013).  
A growing cross-border HIV epidemic, caused by drugs imported from the Golden 
Triangle, has also prompted Yunnan to initiate transboundary counter-narcotics initiatives. 
Yunnan has worked closely with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to train 
Myanmar and Laotian counter-narcotics police, launching 107 joint, cross-border operations 
against drug traffickers from 2002-2005 (Li and Zheng, 2009: 634). Additionally, Yunnan 
has promoted opium substitution in Myanmar and Laos. By 2006, Yunnanese technicians 
have visited over 3,000 sites there, training over 1,000 of their counterparts (Sheng, 2006: 
112). Yunnan has also successfully lobbied Beijing to finance massive subsidies for Chinese 
agribusiness investments to replace poppy fields in GMS countries. Yunnan-based firms have 
invested over RMB1bn in alternative plantation agriculture, covering up to 410,000 hectares 
(Su, 2013: 2; Sheng, 2006: 112). 
Although this might seem to validate liberal optimism about the cooperative impact of 
economic integration, in reality, Yunnan’s primarily economically motivated actions often 
have darker side-effects that generate interscalar conflict and interstate friction. In Myanmar, 
for example, Yunnanese extractive and plantation investments have encouraged violent land 
grabs, undermined subsistence livelihoods, and exacerbated ethnic conflict, severely 
compromising the opium substitution programme (ICG, 2009: 41). Moreover, while Beijing 
has supported the Myanmar government’s bans on border trade in timber and gems to reduce 
the income of the anti-government rebels ‘taxing’ it, Yunnan has sought to defend the trade. 
Yangon holds Beijing accountable for these developments, creating serious 
intergovernmental tensions (Li and Lye, 2009: 266; ICG, 2009: 25-26, 40-41). Accordingly, 
national level agencies have been forced to try to recentralise authority over China’s 
Myanmar policy to mitigate Yunnan’s errors and safeguard broader Chinese interests. Thus, 
in 2009, when Kachin forces resumed their rebellion against Yangon, partly to protest 
rapacious resource extraction, Beijing intervened, mediating peace talks to try to stem the 
flow of refugees and the threat to its oil and gas pipeline (ICG, 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that today’s rising powers are not the unitary states of much IR theorising. 
Rather, reflecting transformations in the global political economy since the 1970s, they are 
increasingly fragmented, decentralised and internationalised. Consequently, different parts of 
rising powers’ states may pursue divergent or contradictory agendas, with outcomes 
reflecting disorganisation and conflict, not grand strategy. Different state and business 
interests may be unevenly integrated into international economic, diplomatic and institutional 
circuits, deepening these contradictions. Moreover, as transnational interests grow, so do 
rising powers’ interests in managing transboundary flows, threats and risks by extending their 
governance frontiers beyond their borders. We demonstrated these arguments using the case 
of China, conventionally considered a classic ‘Westphalian’ state but in reality a complex, 
multilevel governance system riven by contending interests.  
 Clearly, we lack the space here to consider other rising powers. Nonetheless, there is 
prima facie evidence of similar trends elsewhere, suggesting a fruitful research agenda. For 
example, subnational diplomacy and governance rescaling has been observed in Brazil 
(Setzer, 2014), Russia (Sharafutdinova, 2003), India (Sridharan, 2003), and South Africa 
(Nganje, 2014). Naturally, these cases will not be identical to China. Since the transformation 
and operation of state apparatuses are driven by local socio-political conflicts, we anticipate 
considerable variation.  
 Fully revising IR theory to incorporate state transformation is also impossible here, 
but some provisional insights can be offered. China’s internal fragmentation and struggles 
clearly generate quite incoherent, conflict-ridden outcomes. This may help explain why even 
proponents of the same IR theory can identify supporting evidence for both pessimistic and 
optimistic accounts of China’s rise. The contradictory evidence reflects not a failure of 
interpretation but a phenomenon being ignored by IR theory – state transformation. Once we 
attend to this, outcomes appear explicable, contingent and issue-specific, depending on the 
actors and interests involved. This does not mean, for example, that pessimistic realists are 
necessarily wrong that Chinese behaviour in the SCS is threatening and destabilising – it 
clearly is. But this is not because ‘China’ is pursuing some monolithic, expansionist ‘grand 
strategy’ reflecting growing power resources; rather, it reflects internal conflicts among 
disaggregated state and semi-private actors. Similarly, liberals, constructivists and English 
Scholars are not necessarily wrong to claim that some Chinese agencies are now heavily 
involved in international governance. However, they must recognise that others are not, and 
that long run outcomes depend on struggles between contending agents and visions. Nor is 
such internationalisation necessarily inherently ‘liberal’ in content; it frequently is not, 
prompting backlashes that erode China’s so-called ‘soft power’. To generate more accurate 
analyses and predictions, IR scholars must incorporate the conflict-ridden dynamics of state 
transformation into their approaches. 
 Our argument also has implications for practitioners. It suggests that traditional 
diplomatic practices, focused on interactions between foreign ministries, are insufficient to 
inform policies towards China, and possibly other rising powers. The MFA is simply not in 
control of Chinese foreign policy. To assume otherwise risks severe misinterpretation of 
events and disproportionate policy responses that could precipitate serious international 
conflict. To avoid this, diplomats should incorporate our insights into their work. They should 
broaden their contacts, data gathering and analysis to many more actors, and interpret rising 
powers’ behaviour not as monolithic but as reflecting internal disaggregation and conflict. 
They need to identify and encourage those interests most amenable to peaceful cooperation. 
And they should help educate their own policymakers and publics about the realities of 
today’s rising powers. 
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